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Abstract
In this paper big boss interval games are introduced and various
characterizations are given. The structure of the core of a big boss
interval game is explicitly described and plays an important role rela-
tive to interval-type bi-monotonic allocation schemes for such games.
Speciﬁcally, each element of the interval core of a big boss interval
game is extendable to a bi-monotonic allocation scheme. Furthermore,
on the class of big boss interval games two interval solution concepts
of value type are deﬁned which can be seen as extensions of the com-
promise value and the AL-value to the interval setting. It turns out
that these interval solutions coincide and generate a bi-monotonic al-
location scheme for each big boss interval game.
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1 Introduction
Big boss interval games are particular cooperative interval games inspired
by the model of classical big boss games. A cooperative interval game is
∗S¨ uleyman Demirel University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Department of Mathemat-
ics, 32 260 Isparta, Turkey and Institute of Applied Mathematics, Middle East Technical
University, 06531 Ankara, Turkey, e-mail: alzeynep@metu.edu.tr
†This author acknowledges the support of TUBITAK (Turkish Scientiﬁc and Technical
Research Council).
‡Faculty of Computer Science, ”Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University, Ia¸ si, Romania, e-
mail: branzeir@infoiasi.ro
§CentER and Department of Econometrics and OR, Tilburg University, Tilburg,
The Netherlands and Department of Mathematics, University of Genoa, Italy, e-mail:
S.H.Tijs@uvt.nl
1a pair consisting of a set of players and a worth function which assigns to
each coalition a closed interval in R such that the empty coalition receives
[0,0]. Cooperative interval games are a useful tool for modeling real-life sit-
uations where payoﬀs for people or businesses are uncertain and decisions
regarding their cooperation have to be made based on all possible realiza-
tions which belong to intervals whose lower and upper bounds are known
with certainty. An interesting motivating example for the model of coop-
erative interval games game can be found in Bauso and Timmer (2006): a
joint replenishment situation where each retailer faces a demand bounded
by a minimum and a maximum value. The model of cooperative interval
games is ﬁrstly introduced in Branzei, Dimitrov and Tijs (2003) to model
bankruptcy situations under interval uncertainty of claims. Bauso and Tim-
mer (2006) design robust dynamic rules for cooperative games incorporating
interval uncertainty. Alparslan G¨ ok, Miquel and Tijs (2008) consider coop-
erative interval games and look at the corresponding classical cooperative
games, which are selections of the interval game. Based on classical solutions
on the selections such as the core and the Shapley value they deﬁne then
solutions for interval cooperative games. In Alparslan G¨ ok, Branzei and Tijs
(2008a) another approach is taken, where solutions are described with the
aid of tuples of intervals, the focus being on interval cores and stable sets.
Other interval solution concepts like the Shapley value and the Weber set are
introduced on a special class of cooperative interval games in Alparslan G¨ ok,
Branzei and Tijs (2008b). The reader is referred to Alparslan G¨ ok, Branzei
and Tijs (2008c) for a discussion of how interval solutions can be handled in
practice.
The class of classical big boss games (Muto et al. (1988)) has received much
attention in cooperative game theory and various situations were modeled
using such games. We refer here to information market situations (Muto,
Potters and Tijs (1989)), information collecting situations (Branzei, Tijs and
Timmer (2001a, b), Tijs, Timmer and Branzei (2006)) and holding situations
(Tijs, Meca and L´ opez (2005)). In case such situations are described in terms
of interval data the corresponding cooperative games are under restricting
conditions big boss interval games.
The paper is organized as follows. We recall in Section 2 basic notions and
facts from the theory of traditional cooperative games and cooperative in-
terval games. Big boss interval games are introduced and some characteriza-
tions as well as a description of the interval core inspired from the classical
theory are given (Muto et al. (1988)) in Section 3. In Section 4 we study bi-
2monotonic allocation schemes (bi-mas) for big boss interval games and show
that interval core elements are bi-mas extendable. Further, we introduce a
compromise-like solution concept, the T -value, and the interval counterpart
of the AL-value (Tijs (2005)). It turns out that on the class of big boss
interval games these interval solutions coincide and generate an interval-type
bi-mas for each game in this class.
2 Preliminaries
We start this section with basic deﬁnitions and results from the classical
cooperative game theory.
A cooperative game in coalitional form is an ordered pair < N,v >, where
N = {1,2,...,n} is the set of players, and v : 2N → R is a map, assigning
to each coalition S ∈ 2N a real number, such that v(∅) = 0. Often, we also
refer to such a game as a TU (transferable utility) game. We denote by GN
the family of all classical cooperative games with player set N. For a game
v ∈ GN and a coalition T ∈ 2N \ {∅}, the subgame with player set T is the
game vT deﬁned by vT(S) = v(S) for all S ∈ 2T. In the sequel we denote such
subgames by < T,v >. A game v ∈ GN is additive if v(S ∪T) = v(S)+v(T)
for all S,T ∈ 2N with S ∩ T = ∅ (Branzei, Dimitrov and Tijs (2005)).
A game < N,v > is called a big boss game with n as a big boss (Muto et al.
(1988), Tijs (1990)) if the following conditions are satisﬁed:
(i) v ∈ GN is monotonic, i.e. v(S) ≤ v(T) if for each S,T ∈ 2N with
S ⊂ T;
(ii) v(S) = 0 if n / ∈ S;
(iii) v(N)−v(S) ≥
 
i∈N\S(v(N)−v(N \{i})) for all S,T with n ∈ S ⊂ N.
Note that big boss games form a cone in GN. Further, a game < N,v > is
a total big boss game with big boss n if and only if < T,v > is a big boss
game for each T ∈ 2N with n ∈ T.
Definition 2.1. Let v ∈ GN and n ∈ N. Then, this game is a total big boss
game with n as a big boss if the following conditions are satisﬁed:
(i) v ∈ GN is monotonic, i.e. v(S) ≤ v(T) if for each S,T ∈ 2N with
S ⊂ T;
3(ii) v(S) = 0 if n / ∈ S;
(iii) v(T) − v(S) ≥
 
i∈T\S(v(T) − v(T \ {i})) for all S,T with n ∈ S ⊂ T.
In this paper we only consider total big boss games and call them shortly
big boss games. Now, we give some useful deﬁnitions for solutions from the
classical cooperative game theory.
The imputation set of a game < N,v > is deﬁned by
I(N,v) = {x ∈ R
n | x(N) = v(N) and xi ≥ v({i}) for each i ∈ N}.
The core (Gillies (1959)) is a central solution concept on GN. The core










A game whose core is nonempty is called here a balanced game. We recall
that the core C(N,v) of a traditional big boss game is always nonempty
and equal to {x ∈ I(N,v)|0 ≤ xi ≤ Mi(N,v) for each i ∈ N \ {n}}, where
for each i ∈ N, Mi(N,v) = v(N) − v(N \ {i}).
A game v ∈ GN is called quasi-balanced if m(N,v) ≤ M(N,v)
and
 n
i=1 mi(N,v) ≤ v(N) ≤
 n
i=1 Mi(N,v), where for each i ∈ N,
mi(N,v) = max{R(S,i)|i ∈ S,S ⊂ N}
with




The τ-value or compromise value (Tijs (1981)) is deﬁned on the class of quasi-
balanced games. Speciﬁcally, for each quasi-balanced game < N,v > its τ-
value, τ(N,v), is a feasible compromise between the upper vector M(N,v) =
(Mi(N,v))i∈N and the lower vector m(N,v) = (mi(N,v))i∈N of a game sat-
isfying
 
i∈N τi(N,v) = v(N).













4Now, let σ = (σ(1),σ(2)...,σ(k),σ(k + 1),...,σ(n)) be an ordering of the
players in N = {1,2,...,n}. The lexicographic maximum of the core C(N,v)
of a balanced game < N,v > with respect to σ is denoted by Lσ(N,v).
Then, the average lexicographic value AL(N,v) (Tijs (2005)) of v ∈ GN is
the average of all lexicographically maximal vectors of the core of the game,
i.e. AL(N,v) = 1
n!
 








Mσ(i)(N,v), i < k
0, i > k
v(N) −
 k−1
i=1 M(N,v), i = k.
It is known that the AL-value coincides with the τ-value on the class of (to-
tal) big boss games.
In the sequel we recall basic interval calculus and useful notions and re-
sults regarding cooperative interval games (Alparslan G¨ ok, Branzei and Tijs
(2008a,b)).








, |I| = I − I and α ∈ R+. Then,
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By (i) and (ii) we see that I(R)N has a cone structure.
In this paper we also need a partial substraction operator. We deﬁne I − J,










I − J,I − J
 
. Note that
I − J ≤ I − J. We recall that I is weakly better than J, which we denote
by I   J, if and only if I ≥ J and I ≥ J. We also use the reverse notation
J   I, if and only if J ≤ I and J ≤ I.
We recall that a cooperative interval game in coalitional form (Alparslan G¨ ok,
Miquel and Tijs (2008)) is an ordered pair < N,w > where N = {1,2,...,n}
is the set of players, and w : 2N → I(R) is the characteristic function such
that w(∅) = [0,0], where I(R) is the set of all closed intervals in R. For
each S ∈ 2N, the worth set (or worth interval) w(S) of the coalition S in the
interval game < N,w > is of the form [w(S),w(S)], where w(S) is the lower
bound and w(S) is the upper bound of w(S). We denote by IGN the family
of all interval games with player set N. Note that if all the worth intervals
are degenerate intervals, i.e. w(S) = w(S) for each S ∈ 2N, then the interval
game < N,w > corresponds in a natural way to the classical cooperative
5game < N,v > where v(S) = w(S).
Some classical TU-games associated with an interval game w ∈ IGN will play
a key role, namely the border games < N,w >, < N,w > and the length
game < N,|w| >, where |w|(S) = w(S) − w(S) for each S ∈ 2N. Note that
w = w + |w|.
For w1,w2 ∈ IGN we say that w1   w2 if w1(S)   w2(S), for each S ∈ 2N.
For w1,w2 ∈ IGN and λ ∈ R+ we deﬁne < N,w1 + w2 > and < N,λw > by
(w1 +w2)(S) = w1(S)+w2(S) and (λw)(S) = λ·w(S) for each S ∈ 2N. So,
we conclude that IGN endowed with   is a partially ordered set and has a
cone structure with respect to addition and multiplication with non-negative
scalars described above. For w1,w2 ∈ IGN with |w1(S)| ≥ |w2(S)| for each
S ∈ 2N, < N,w1 − w2 > is deﬁned by (w1 − w2)(S) = w1(S) − w2(S).
Now, we recall the deﬁnitions of the interval imputation set and the interval
core of an interval game.








Ii = w(N),w(i)   Ii, for all i ∈ N
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i∈N Ii = w(N) is the eﬃciency condition and
 
i∈S Ii   w(S),
S ∈ 2N \ {∅}, are the stability conditions of (I1,...,In).
We recall that for a game w ∈ IGN and a coalition S ∈ 2N \{∅}, the subgame
with player set T is the game wT deﬁned by wT(S) = w(S) for all S ∈ 2T.
So, wT is the restriction of w to the set 2T. Next, we refer to such subgames
by < T,w >.
A game w ∈ IGN is called I-balanced if and only if the interval core C(N,w)
is nonempty (Theorem 3.1 in Alparslan G¨ ok, Branzei and Tijs (2008a)) and
a game w ∈ IGN whose all subgames are I-balanced is called a totally I-
balanced interval game.
We call a game < N,w > size monotonic if < N,|w| > is monotonic, i.e.
|w|(S) ≤ |w|(T) for all S,T ∈ 2N with S ⊂ T. For further use we denote by
SMIGN the class of size monotonic interval games with player set N.
63 Big boss interval games
Let w ∈ IGN and let < N,|w| > be the corresponding length game. Then,
we call a game < N,w > a big boss interval game if its border game < N,w >
and the game < N,|w| > are classical (total) big boss games. We denote by
BBIGN the set of all big boss interval games with player set N (without loss
of generality we denote the big boss by n). Note that BBIGN is a subcone
of IGN.
The interval game in the next example is not a big boss interval game since
the related length game is not a big boss game.
Example 3.1. Let < N,w > be a three-person interval game with w(1) =
w(2) = w(3) = w(1,2) = [0,0],w(2,3) = [5,6],w(1,3) = [6,6] and w(N) =
[9,11]. Here, < N,w > is a big boss game, but the length game < N,|w| >
is not because it does not satisfy the condition (iii) in Deﬁnition 2.1 (take
S = {1}).
In the following proposition and theorem characterizations for big boss
interval games are given.
Proposition 3.1. Let w ∈ IGN and its related games |w|,w,w ∈ GN.
Then, w ∈ BBIGN if and only if its length game < N,|w| > and its border
games < N,w >, < N,w > are big boss games.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. Note that w = w + |w| is a big boss
game because classical big boss games form a cone.
Theorem 3.1. Let w ∈ SMIGN. Then, the following two conditions are
equivalent:
(i) w ∈ BBIGN;
(ii) < N,w > satisﬁes:
(a) Big boss property:
w(S) = [0,0] for each S ∈ 2N with n / ∈ S ;
(b) Monotonicity property:





(w(T)−w(T\{i})) for all S,T with n ∈ S ⊂ T.
7Proof. By Proposition 3.1, w ∈ BBIGN if and only if < N,w >,
< N,w − w > and < N,w > are classical big boss games. Now, using
Deﬁnition 2.1, w ∈ BBIGN if and only if < N,w > satisﬁes (a), (b) and
(c).
Now, we deﬁne for each w ∈ SMIGN and each i ∈ N, the marginal
contribution of i in the game w by Mi(N,w) = w(N) − w(N \ {i}).
Further, we give a concavity property for big boss interval games with n as
a big boss.
(d) n-concavity property:
w(S ∪ {i}) − w(S)   w(T ∪ {i}) − w(T),
for all S,T ∈ 2N with n ∈ S ⊂ T ⊂ N \ {i}.
The following theorem which is inspired by (Branzei, Tijs and Timmer (2001b))
shows that (c) and (d) are equivalent if (a), (b) hold.
Theorem 3.2. Let w ∈ IGN and let (a), (b) hold. Then, (c) implies (d) and
conversely.
Proof. (i) Suppose that (d) holds. Let S,T be such that n ∈ S ⊂ T.
Suppose T \ S = {i1,...,ih}. Then,
















where “the inequality” follows from (d). So, (d) implies (c).
(ii) Suppose that (c) holds. Then,
w(U ∪ {j}) − w(U \ {i})   Mj(U ∪ {j},w) + Mi(U ∪ {j},w). (1)
8But,
w(U ∪ {j}) − w(U \ {i}) = w(U ∪ {j}) − w(U) + w(U) − w(U \ {i})
= Mj(U ∪ {j},w) + Mi(U,w). (2)
From (1) and (2) we obtain
Mi(U,w)   Mi(U ∪ {j},w) (3)
for all U ⊂ N and i,j ∈ N \ {n} such that {i,n} ⊂ U ⊂ N \ {j}.
Now, take S,T ⊂ N with {i,n} ⊂ S ⊂ T and suppose that T \ S =
{i1,...,ih}. If we apply (3) h times then we have Mi(S,w)   Mi(S ∪
{i1},w)   Mi(S ∪ {i1,i2},w)   ...   Mi(T,w). So, (c) implies (d).
We deﬁne the set K(T,w) for each subgame < T,w > of < N,w > by
K(T,w) = {(I1,...,In) ∈ I(T,w) | [0,0]   Ii   Mi(T,w) for each i ∈ T \ {n}}.
The next proposition gives a characterization of the interval core of a big
boss interval game by using marginal contributions of the players.
Proposition 3.2. Let w ∈ BBIGN. Then,
C(T,w) = K(T,w). (4)
Proof. It is suﬃcient to show C(T,w) = K(T,w) for T = N.





j∈N\{i} Ij   w(N \ {i}), for all i ∈










Ij   w(N)−w(N\{i}) = Mi(N,w),
where the second equality follows from eﬃciency and “the inequality”
follows from stability. Clearly, Ii   [0,0] = w(i) for i ∈ N \ {n}. So,
I ∈ K(N,w). Therefore C(N,w) ⊂ K(N,w) holds.
9(ii) Suppose that I = (I1,...,In) ∈ K(N,w). Then, for a coalition S
which does not contain n, one ﬁnds that
 
i∈S Ii   [0,0] = w(S). To
prove that
 
i∈S Ii   w(S) for S such that n ∈ S we ﬁrst show that
w(N) − w(S)  
 
i∈N\S Mi(N,w). Let N \ S = {i1,...,ik}. Then, in
a similar way as in the proof of Theorem 3.2 (i) with N in the role of
T we have
















where “the inequality” follows from the n-concavity property. Then,
using the deﬁnition of K(N,w) we have
w(S)   w(N) −
 
i∈N\S







So, I ∈ C(N,w). Therefore K(N,w) ⊂ C(N,w) holds.
Next, we deﬁne for a (big boss) subgame < T,w > (with n as a big boss)
of w ∈ BBIGN two particular elements of its interval core, which we call the
big boss interval point and the union interval point. These points will play
an important role regarding the characterization of big boss games using the




[0,0], j ∈ T \ {n}
w(T), j = n,
and the union interval point U(T,w) is deﬁned by
Uj(T,w) =
 
Mj(T,w), j ∈ T \ {n}
w(T) −
 
i∈T\n Mi(T,w), j = n.
10Theorem 3.3. Let w ∈ IGN be such that property (a) in Theorem 3.1 holds.
Then, w ∈ BBIGN if and only if for each T ⊂ N with n ∈ T the big boss
interval point B(T,w) and the union interval point U(T,w) belong to the
interval core of < T,w >.
Proof. If w ∈ BBIGN then by Proposition 3.2 it is clear that B(T,w) and
U(T,w) ∈ C(T,w) for each T ⊂ N with n ∈ T.
Conversely, assume that for each T ⊂ N with n ∈ T the points B(T,w) and
U(T,w) belong to the interval core. Since by hypothesis < N,w > satisﬁes
(a), we only need to show that (b) and (c) hold.




Bi(T,w) = Bn(T,w) +
 
i∈S\n
Bi(T,w) = w(T) + [0,0] = w(T).
So, (b) is satisﬁed.


















So, (c) is satisﬁed.
From the above theorem we learn that big boss interval games are totally
I-balanced games. Note that B : BBIGN → I(R)N and U : BBIGN →
I(R)N are additive maps.
Next we give an example with economic ﬂavour leading to a big boss interval
game.
Example 3.2. Let us consider a production economy with one landlord and
many peasants. Let N = {1,2,...,n} be the player set, where 1 is the land-
lord who can not produce anything alone, and 2,3,...,n are landless peas-
ants.
Let f : [0,n] ։ I(R) be the production function with interval data, where
f(s) is the interval reward [f1(s),f2(s)] if s peasants are hired by the land-
lord, where f(0) = [0,0], f1 and f2 − f1 are concave with f2 − f1 ≥ 0. The
11situation can be modeled by the big boss interval game < N,w >, where
N = {1,2,...,n} and the characteristic function is given by
w(S) =
 
[0,0], 1 / ∈ S
f(|S| − 1), 1 ∈ S.
4 Bi-monotonic allocation schemes
In this section we introduce bi-monotonic allocation schemes (bi-mas) for big
boss interval games. We denote by Pn the set {S ⊂ N|n ∈ S} of all coalitions
containing the big boss.
Take a game w ∈ BBIGN with n as a big boss. We call a scheme B =
(BiS)i∈S,S∈Pn an (interval) allocation scheme for w if (BiS)i∈S is an interval
core element of the subgame < S,w > for each coalition S ∈ Pn. Such
an allocation scheme B = (BiS)i∈S,S∈Pn is called a bi-monotonic (interval)
allocation scheme (bi-mas) for w if for all S,T ∈ Pn with S ⊂ T we have
BiS   BiT for all i ∈ S \ {n}, and BnS   BnT. In a bi-mas the big boss
is weakly better oﬀ in larger coalitions, while the other players are weakly
worse oﬀ.
We say that for a game w ∈ BBIGN with n as a big boss an imputation
I = (I1,...,In) ∈ I(w) is bi-mas extendable if there exists a bi-mas B =
(BiS)i∈S,S∈Pn such that BiN = Ii for each i ∈ N. The next theorem is
inspired by Voorneveld, Tijs and Grahn (2003).
Theorem 4.1. Let w ∈ BBIGN with n as a big boss and let I ∈ C(N,w).
Then, I is bi-mas extendable.
Proof. Since I ∈ C(N,w), by (4), we can ﬁnd for each i ∈ N \ {n} an αi ∈
[0,1], such that Ii = αiMi(N,w), and then In = w(N)−
 
i∈N\{n} αiMi(N,w).
We will show that (BiS)i∈S,S∈Pn, deﬁned by BiS = αiMi(S,w) for each S and
i such that i ∈ S \ {n}, and BnS = w(S) −
 
i∈S\{n} αiMi(S,w) is a bi-mas.
Take S,T ∈ Pn with S ⊂ T and i ∈ S\{n}. We have to prove that BiS   BiT
and BnS   BnT. First, BiS = αiMi(S,w)   αiMi(T,w) = BiT, where “the
12inequality” follows from (d). Second,




























(1 − αi)Mi(T,w)   BnS
where the ﬁrst follows from (c), the second follows from (d), and the third fol-
lows from αi ≤ 1 and the nonincreasing of the interval marginal contribution
vectors. So, BnT   BnS.
Now, we introduce on the class of big boss interval games an interval
compromise-like solution concept, called the T -value, and the interval AL-
value inspired by Tijs (2005), and show that the T -value equals the interval
AL-value.





Note that T : BBIGN → I(R)N has some trade-oﬀ ﬂavour because T (N,w)
is the average of the union point U(N,w) and the big boss interval point
B(N,w) for each w ∈ BBIGN.
Given a game w ∈ BBIGN, and an ordering
σ = (σ(1),σ(2)...,σ(k),σ(k + 1),...,σ(n))
of the players in N = {1,2,...,n}, the lexicographic maximum of the interval
core C(N,w) of < N,w > with respect to σ, which we denote by Lσ(N,w),







Mσ(i)(N,w), i < k
0, i > k
w(N) −
 k−1
j=1 Mj(N,w), i = k.
(5)
13We notice that Lσ is additive on BBIGN.









where Π(N) is the set of permutations σ : N → N.













So, we have AL(N,w) = T (N,w).
Remark 4.1. Let w ∈ BBIGN with n as a big boss. Then,
T (N,w) = AL(N,w) ∈ C(N,w)
and the (total) AL-value generates a bi-mas for w ∈ BBIGN.
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